It is beyond words
even those. But mystics employ
Indiana University – Bloomington
“Ineffability and Self-Refutation: Non-Monotonic Logic in the Thought of Pseudo-Dionysius, Sextus Empiricus, and the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita”, 2003.
Skirmishes for truth
partisans of translation
know Rorty is wrong.
Sad, but I can’t remember the title of my thesis—let’s call it “Davidson and Rorty on truth and translation
Why can’t I recall
That tree we saw, but I can
Remember your face?
Warburg Institute, University of London
My MA dissertation is on Girolamo Fracastoro’s dialogue on the intellect, Turrius, sive de intellectione (1553), and his explanation of the persistence of representations in memory. A natural philosopher on the threshold of scientific psychology, Fracastoro regards memory as a divine operation which, occurring in the wake of sense perception, also has a physiological basis. He adopts the medieval theory of the species as the transmitter of sensible representations to the soul and, relying largely on Aristotelian sources, defines the process of memory as the constant reconnecting of those species that are preserved within the soul, a model somewhat akin to theories in neuroscience today that posit memory as the continual process of neural connections.
A or B, too vague
Am I who I used to be?
University of Leeds
My dissertation is entitled “Is there any good reason to believe in the existence of temporal parts?” I work on disproving Leibniz’s Law that for two objects to be identical they must have exactly the same properties, since this fails to apply for one object changing over time.
Maxwell’s Demon lives
for more than a hundred years.
It cannot be killed.
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Maxwell’s Demon is a thought experiment, devised by James Clerk Maxwell in 1867 as a counter example for the Second Law of thermodynamics. Since then, people have tried to show that the law is valid and a Demon cannot exist. My thesis examines these attempts and shows that they are flawed.
Responsible, we are not…
Save by convention.
Dissertation Title: The Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Finding Freedom After Frankfurt (2006).
My dissertation examines the principle that alternate possibilities are required for moral responsibility (PAP) and the debate that followed Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article attacking it. I conclude that libertarian concerns have not been adequately addressed by compatibilists, so that any robust sense of moral responsibility requires alternate possibilities and an agent capable of realizing them. The nature of such an agent would necessarily be quite mysterious. Nevertheless, a conventional sense of moral responsibility could remain untouched by the lack of such agency.
not just self-love but
self-duty and widening love
University of Connecticut
Dissertation Title: “Practical Reasoning and Contractarian Ethics”
My dissertation combines a Humean, naturalistic account of practical reasoning with a Hobbesian, reductionist version of contractarianism that derives moral principles from non-moral practical reasoning in strategic contexts. But with this twist: I argue that besides instrumental reasoning there are other forms of practical reasoning involving sympathy and commitment. Then I endeavor to show that the version of contractarianism with this new twist can avoid the problems besetting the best available instrumentalist version of the same (i.e., Gauthier’s), and that the former will arrive at normative conclusions very different from those of the latter.
See a painted tree:
tis there, tis not. Not deceived--
State University of New York at Albany
My dissertation concerns Ernst Gombrich’s theory that the way in which pictures represent objects involves some kind of illusion. When we we see a picture of a tree we do see a tree, even while at the same time knowing that we are not seeing an actual tree. It is simply the case that the features in the picture can trigger off a similar visual experience to that of the object—thus, illusion.
Infinite as one
And infinite as many
What’s the connection?
West Chester University of Pennsylvania
Dissertation Title: Spinoza’s Conception of the Infinite
In my dissertation I explore the relationship in Spinoza’s metaphysics between the conception of infinity as indivisible and unique that pertains to the nature of substance and the conception of infinity as divisible and plural that pertains to the nature of modes. I contend that the relationship between these two conceptions is central to the structure of Spinoza’s metaphysical system, and develop an account wherein the attributes function as a middle term in the relation between substance and modes insofar as each attribute expresses both forms of infinity.
unsuitable for error
in chaos theory
London School of Economics
The two themes of my project are chaos theory and uncertainty. We use computer simulations to model chaotic systems. I argue that because of model error, probability theory is an inadequate representation of the uncertainty that arises when studying chaotic systems.
The good merits praise;
Colors are dispositions.
How alike they are!
Rodney W. Cupp
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Dissertation title: “A sensible ethics: The analogy between color and value” (2004)
This dissertation explores an analogy between moral properties and color. Some philosophers claim that moral properties and secondary qualities are similar: both kinds of property are essentially tied to human sensibility, and we seem confronted in our experiences of both kinds of property with something the existence of which is independent of those experiences. Such similarities suggest that the correct analysis of color concepts is a proper model for the correct analysis of moral properties.
once beliefs are shared
language emerges, and this
gives us bigger thoughts
cathal o madagain
University of Toronto
Language can only take place once two or more people have shared beliefs about the meanings of words. So Wittgenstein argued, and I think that’s right. More importantly, there are certain kinds of thoughts – most interestingly thoughts about fallibility and truth – that we can only have with language, and so that we can only have once we belong to a community with which we share beliefs.
Science brings greatness
But come on, researchers please
Let’s not get stupid.
Australian National University, Canberra
Dissertation Title: The Dual-Use Dilemma – Lessons from Nuclear Science
I argue from a historical and philosophical basis for more accountability from scientists in responsible conduct of research. Particularly, I argue for increased oversight and awareness of research which could lead to dangerous technologies as well as beneficial ones (“the dual-use dilemma”), and solutions to these problems as they emerge.
Needs no justification
According to Locke?
University of California, Santa Barbara
My dissertation was in political/social philosophy.
But ideas are not genes:
All can value all.
George M. Felis
The University of Georgia
Dissertation Title: Evolved Value and the Foundations of Ethical Theory
My (2009) dissertation argues that value evolves, but that evolved value is selfish/amoral. Evolved value can expand to other organisms through reciprocal altruism, but truly universal/moral value only becomes possible through culture, which transcends natural selection’s inherently competitive component because ideas can be passed along freely, not just to offspring.
Dude you are so weird
I cannot even see you
Infinite big props
Dissertation title: “Difference and Sense: The Problem of Phenomenology in the Work of Emmanuel Levinas”.
Concerned the phenomenological foundations of Levinas’ ethics, with particular
Locke’s mind makes all his
complex ideas only
from received simples
D. Kenneth Brown
University of California, Irvine
I’m a professor at Cal Poly teaching history of philosophy (mostly early modern, but also ancient and early 20th century philosophy too). I specialize in the theory of ideas employed in John Locke’s “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.”
conceptual through and through
so as to grasp facts.
University of California, San Diego
My 2007 dissertation in philosophy, “Concepts in Experience: An Essay on Conceptualism,” defends the conceptualist position, often characterized as the view that “experience is conceptual through and through.” I argue that we experience facts and that inasmuch as facts are social we cannot characterize experience without reference to the normative practices of reason-giving that define the conceptual.
I don’t know I know don’t help
me understand nothin’
University of London
Dissertation Title: Assertion, Presupposition, Pragmatics
Everyone agrees that when we converse we use presuppositions to determine what is said by an utterance or string of sounds. Recently some people claimed that some of the presuppositions we use to interpret utterances are non-transparent or “subconscious”. If that’s right, a prominent theory of assertion is in a place. So I argue that while we sometimes use non-transparent presuppositions it is rather atypical to do so and thus the prominent theory is still useful.
A red tomato -
Your visual perception
Is direct and thick
Dissertation Title: Phenomenal Acquaintance
My dissertation is about our special cognitive relation to our current experiences. Two features of this relation: it is direct and thick (i.e. substantive and determinate).
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